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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' threatens to
trigger an ambiguous paradigm shift in administrative law. In
1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert and established judges
as gatekeepers for expert testimony in both civil and criminal
trials. The case has had enormous impact on the use of experts in
litigation. Some have called for agencies and/or courts to adopt
some form of "regulatory Daubert," essentially requesting a
standard to examine, test, or question evidence relied upon by
federal agencies. Daubert proponents have offered various means
to adopt this heightened scrutiny of agencies. Critics have
explained why agencies should not be subjected to Daubert as a
normative matter. My concern in this essay is the effect any form
of regulatory Daubert could have on administrative law. There is a
danger that Daubert can undermine administrative law by fostering
an attitude of skepticism of agency action based upon science and
creating a rhetorical weapon with which to attack agency policy-
making.
Those who follow administrative law recall the power of
paradigm shifts by referencing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 Chevron established that courts
will defer to reasonable agency interpretations of its own organic
statute where the statute is vague or ambiguous. 3 Chevron sought
to improve administrative law functioning; although some may
argue about whether its goals were desirable, its goals were
administrative law goals. Agencies' relative specialization and
political accountability, as compared to courts, supported the
Chevron shift to a more deferential judicial framework.
Nonetheless, Chevron was a somewhat murky standard that caused
and continues to cause problems in administrative law. Sometimes
known as the counter-Marbury, because it directs agencies to,
under certain circumstances, "say what the law is,"'4 Chevron
spawned issues regarding its applicability, its scope, and its
application. Chevron also became a rhetorical tool, as it turned into
a rallying cry of deference. The rhetorical effect of Chevron was
perhaps unavoidable but nevertheless disruptive.
A Daubert shift threatens agency functioning and lacks
Chevron's administrative law agenda. As an enigmatic paradigm
shift in the administrative law context, Daubert will likely
engender many of the same problems associated with the Chevron
shift, while also creating additional problems. A regulatory
Daubert standard is even less clear than Chevron. Further,
regulatory Daubert lacks the normative administrative law goal
found in Chevron. Chevron sought to improve administrative law
functioning. Daubert aims more at substantive law areas that rely
upon science. This Daubert Trojan horse threatens sound
administrative law doctrine by devolving into a rhetorical tool and
a generic standard. To the extent that agency decision-making
often blends factual and policy issues, regulatory Daubert will
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 See id. at 843.
4 Chevron became known as the counter-Marbury because Marbury v.
Madison stood for the proposition that it was the courts that were to "say what
the law is" while Chevron empowered agencies to do so. Cass R. Sunstein, Law
& Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2074-75 (1990)
(explaining Chevron's relationship to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.W. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803)).
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inevitably impede the policy function given to the agencies by
Chevron and place it in the hands of the judiciary. In this regard,
regulatory Daubert is the counter-Chevron.5 There also seems to
be little need for Daubert in the agency setting. Although no one
would argue that agencies should use "junk science," agencies
already have the means and an obligation to avoid doing so.
6
Part I of this essay briefly recounts the current debates over
Daubert in both the civil and administrative contexts. These
debates focus on Daubert's normative appeal. Part II explains the
means by which agencies might adopt or have thrust upon them
some sort of Daubert criteria. These means include more vigorous
review using already established administrative law doctrine,
statutory directives requiring agencies to evaluate scientific or
expert data more rigorously, wholesale adoption of a regulatory
Daubert framework by agencies or courts, and judicial invocation
of Daubert principles more generally.
Part III argues that any framework that extends beyond already
established administrative law doctrine risks an unclear and
unhelpful paradigm shift toward less deference and greater judicial
scrutiny of both data and policy decisions by agencies, causing
confusion and instability. Part III uses the Chevron doctrine as a
model paradigmatic event in administrative law in order to
illustrate the inherent difficulties in paradigm shifts. The Chevron
shift, normatively aimed at improving administrative functioning,
was unfortunately less than crystal clear and thus spawned thirty
years of confusion and missteps. Although I would contend that
Chevron ultimately benefited administrative functioning, I do not
5 The call for regulatory Daubert is essentially a call for courts to be less
deferential to agency decisions. See Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer,
Regulatory Daubert: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review ofAgency Science
by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (2003). But see id. at 32 (explaining that "Daubert
principles could easily and properly inform Chevron analysis without
eliminating Chevron deference").
6 Wendy Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through
the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 589, 591-94 (2004) (comparing
agency expertise to that of courts) [hereinafter Wagner, Importing Daubert]. See
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d), 553(c), 706 (2000).
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believe that a Daubert shift would hold the same promise.
Adapting Daubert to the regulatory realm promises a standard
even more unclear than Chevron. Regulatory Daubert is not aimed
at administrative functioning but rather at substantive areas of
administrative law that use and make policy decisions involving
scientific evidence.
I. THE DA UBERT DEBATES
Daubert established federal judges as gatekeepers, requiring
them to evaluate proffered expert testimony and consider several
factors before admitting it.7 Assigning the role of gatekeeper to the
judge changed how courts received and reviewed expert evidence.
Previous courts generally deferred to expert communities.
8
Daubert mandated that the trial judge evaluate the evidence for
herself based upon a non-exclusive list of factors. 9 General
Electric Co. v. Joiner ° followed Daubert and added that a trial
judge's exclusion of evidence under Daubert would only be
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
The specific factors explicated by the Daubert Court are (1) whether
the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested-that is,
whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense,
or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique
or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls;
and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in
the scientific community.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amendment). Daubert
shifted away from the Frye general acceptance standard where courts generally
deferred to scientific communities. David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80
DENV. U. L. REv. 345, 372 (2002) (commenting that the change, on balance,
"appears to make good sense").
8 Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, AMER. J.
OF PUB. HEALTH, July 2005, at S60.
9 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
10 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
reversed for abuse of discretion." Subsequently, in Weisgram v.
Marley,12 the Supreme Court further indicated that since parties
were on notice to present their best evidence in light of Daubert,
appellate courts could enter a verdict against a party whose
evidence was excluded by a Daubert challenge on appeal. 13
Daubert generated significant commentary and debate. 4 Some
have argued that courts' new gatekeeping role may distort the
appropriate use of science in the court room.15 For example, by
testing each scientific assertion separately and excluding any
evidence that does not conform to Daubert, courts may
inappropriately exclude evidence that is probative when combined
with other evidence. 16 Professor McGarity distinguished this new
corpuscular approach from the weight-of-the-evidence approach:
The weight-of-the-evidence approach focuses upon the
totality of the scientific information and asks whether a
11/d. Subsequently, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999),
established that Daubert applied to all expert testimony, not just scientific
testimony, and also reinforced the abuse of discretion standard.
12 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
13 Id. at 455-56. See also FED. R. Civ. P. (50)(a)(1).
14 Compare Thomas 0. McGarity, On the Prospect of "Daubertizing"
Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 156
(2003) (noting that "assigning a Daubert-like gatekeeper role to courts engaged
in judicial review of agency risk assessments is a profoundly bad idea")
[hereinafter McGarity, "Daubertizing" Judicial Review], and Neil B. Cohen,
The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in
Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 943, 963 (2003) (explaining
how "Daubert gatekeeping" risks exclusion of relevant and helpful evidence in
civil litigation), and Berger, supra note 8, at S59, with Owen, supra note 7, at
373 (concluding that "the reliability and relevancy principles of Daubert, used
properly, provide a firm foundation for the fair and rational resolution of the
scientific and technological issues which lie at the heart of products liability
adjudication").
15 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 14, at 961-63. But see Thomas Michael
Spitaletto, The Frye Standard Finally Fries: Has Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Furthered the Use of Scientific Evidence in our Legal System?, 14 REv. LITIG.
315, 320 (1994) (noting the positive effect Daubert has had on the distorting
effect of junk science in the court room).
16 Berger, supra note 8, at S60.
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cause-effect conclusion seems warranted. Given the
inevitability of flaws in individual studies and the fact that
some of the studies were not undertaken with the litigative
or regulatory process in mind, this necessarily involves the
exercise of scientific judgment grounded in scientific
expertise. The corpuscular approach focuses upon the
inevitable flaws in individual studies and asks whether a
sufficient number of unflawed studies that are sufficiently
relevant to the causation issue remain to support a
conclusion that is in itself relevant and reliable. Under the
corpuscular approach, a study is either valid or invalid, and
it is either relevant or irrelevant. A conclusion based upon
invalid or irrelevant studies cannot be relevant and reliable
and must therefore be rejected.17
Additionally, courts may be confusing similar but distinct legal
and scientific terms.18 For example, where both courts and
scientists may speak of probabilities, scientists may be comfortable
with inferences that are suggested but cannot be proven.' 9 The
legal system, uncomfortable with uncertainties, requires that
something be either proven or not proven, and will translate merely
suggested inferences into unproven evidence. 20 Therefore it is
17 Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Good Science and Their Science is
Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and
Responsibilities for Risk Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv.
897, 924 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, Our Science]. See also McGarity,
"Daubertizing" Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 166, 178-221 (discussing
Flue Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435
(M.D.N.C. 1998), vac'd& rem'd 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002), as an example of
the corpuscular approach); Berger, supra note 8, at S60.
18 Cohen, supra note 14, at 945 (explaining how the ability to express the
burden of persuasion probabilistically in civil litigation "masks the important
differences in the value systems that govern standards of legal proof and parallel
standards of scientific and technical inquiry").
'9 Id. at 950-51.
20 Id, Professor Cohen also comments on the confusion over Daubert
noting, "some post-Daubert cases suggest that the deference to the methods of
the world of scientific decision-making is already beginning to have the
undesirable effect of confusing scientific and legal values, and the norms that
Daubert in the Regulatory Realm
tempting, but perhaps inappropriate, to map scientific terms
directly onto legal proceedings.
On the other side of the debate, some see Daubert as a
reasonable tool to screen evidence that reaches the jury. Judges are
better suited to evaluate the validity of complex evidence than
juries.21 Scientific evidence tends to be complex, and therefore, a
simple relevancy threshold may be inadequate to properly filter
evidence.22 And some would argue that it makes common sense
that the party charged with deciding who wins the case-the
jury-should not also be charged with determining whether
evidence is valid.23 Juries can be confused or overwhelmed by
expert and particularly scientific testimony. 24 Thus, some argue
that, appropriately employed, Daubert serves a useful purpose.25
As the debate over the appropriateness or the effects of
Daubert continues, one must recognize that there is an entirely
follow from them." Id. at 958. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme
Court's Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in FED. REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 32-38 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. Ed., 2d ed. 2000)
(discussing difficulties proving causation in toxic tort cases).
21 Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now




24 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (discussing FED. R. EvID. 403).
25 Owen, supra note 7, at 373. There is some indication that the courts
applying the Daubert trilogy themselves are adopting the more conservative
approach. Professor Margaret Berger notes:
Although nothing in the Kumho opinion is inconsistent with Daubert,
the Court's opinion does seem to set out a more flexible test. Instead of
stressing factors that, although not definitive, are nevertheless
suggested as guides for determining reliability, Justice Breyer in
Kumho stressed the need to look at reliability in the context of the
particular case and the testimony being offered. Courts, however, are
citing and relying on Daubert more frequently than Kumho. (A
Westlaw search on June 28, 2004, found 2708 citations in judicial
opinions to Daubert since Kumho was decided and only 1454 citations
to Kumho.).
Berger, supra note 8, at S61.
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separate debate over its appropriateness and usefulness in the
administrative law realm. 26 In Science for Judges IV, Professor
Wagner outlined the risks of substantive errors and the process
costs associated with the importation of Daubert by administrative
agencies through the Information (or Data) Quality Act (IQA or
27DQA). As Professor Wagner points out, agencies and courts play
fundamentally different roles. Agencies are often experts
themselves or can employ experts.28 Agency processes, as well as
external forces, cabin agency discretion and provide checks and
26 Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate
Over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 96-97 (2003) (challenging the good science
reforms in the administrative realm) [hereinafter Wagner, "Bad Science"
Fiction]; Wagner, Importing Daubert, supra note 6 (discussing the Information
(or Data) Quality Act); David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific
Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise
of the Formal Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 17, 39-41 (2005) (explaining
Daubert's application to the scientific basis for public safety and heath
regulations as "both counterproductive and dangerous"). Cf, Paul S. Miller &
Bert W. Rein, "Gatekeeping" Agency Science and Technical Materials After
Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Ability in the Administrative Process, 17
ToURo L. REv. 297 (2000) (advocating the use of Daubert by agencies through
executive order to prevent restrictive overregulation); Raul & Dwyer, supra note
5, at 8 (arguing that Daubert principles "should apply to the review of agency
rulemaking under the APA" and asserting that Daubert-style analysis would
better document scientific decisions and "enhance the rigor and predictability of
judicial review of agency action based on scientific evidence").
27 Wagner, Importing Daubert, supra note 6, at 600-12. Professor Wagner
notes in particular, the problems with the DQA given the "institutional
differences between the agencies and the courts that could lead the [DQA] to be
more damaging and potentially counterproductive as compared with the courts'
use of Daubert." Id. at 598. Professor Wagner outlines the substantive errors and
process costs that can arise from importing Daubert via the DQA into the
administrative realm. Among these is the danger that a Daubert standard will
infect policy decisions under the guise of challenging data, imposing a greater
informational burden on agencies and slowing down the administrative process.
Id. at 600-12.
28 Id. at 592-93. See also Wendy Wagner, The Perils of Relying on
Interested Parties to Evaluate Scientific Quality, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH,
July 2005, at S99-S 100 [hereinafter Wagner, The Perils of Relying on Interested
Parties].
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balances to deter agency reliance on "bad science.' ' 29 At the same
time, Professor Wagner explains how the agency setting as a non-
adversarial policy forum lacks institutional protections against
Daubert abuses.30 Finally, as Professor Wagner points out, the line
between agency policy-making and scientific fact-finding can be
blurred.31 In a related vein, Professor McGarity notes that
"'Daubertizing' judicial review of agency risk assessments will
bestow upon courts a policymaking role that is entirely
inappropriate for a politically unaccountable institution.'
32
Conversely, others contend the evils of junk science that visit
agency processes equally demand appropriate gatekeeping.
33
Courts imposing regulatory Daubert will force agencies to better
explain themselves, better document their findings, and expose
themselves to greater scrutiny.34 Some would note that imposing
Daubert principles upon agencies would enhance the "rigor and
predictability of judicial review of agency action based on
scientific evidence."
35
29 Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction, supra note 26, at 79-80 (noting inter
alia the effect of scientific advisory boards, judicial review, and Congressional
oversight).
30 Wagner, Importing Daubert, supra note 6, at 598. Wagner points out that
"no attention has been given to tracing these proposals through the agencies to
determine the types of unintended administrative reactions they are likely to
produce." Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction, supra note 26, at 72.
31 Wagner, Importing Daubert, supra note 6, at 601-02.
32 McGarity, "Daubertizing" Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 156. See
also Wagner, The Perils of Relying on Interested Parties, supra note 28, at
S 102-03 (discussing the danger of blurring the line between science and policy).
33 While not advocating regulatory Daubert, Professor Elliott has noted that
courts' traditionally deferential attitude towards agency decision-making may be
inappropriately exaggerated when agencies rely on technical or scientific
rationales. E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a
Crowd?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125, 10126 (2001).
34 Id. at 10130.
35 Raul & Dwyer, supra note 5, at 8. See also D. Hiep Truong, Daubert and
Judicial Review: How Does an Administrative Agency Distinguish Valid Science
from Junk Science?, 33 AKRON L. REv. 365, 369 (2000); Miller & Rein, supra
note 26, at 298 (suggesting that courts reviewing agencies must perform some
gatekeeping function).
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I would like to raise a small but significant additional
consideration for the regulatory Daubert debate, namely that
regulatory Daubert may creep into judicial opinions via numerous
routes and slowly impel a murky paradigm shift in the review of
agency actions. My concerns are that: (i) the numerous routes by
which Daubert can creep into agency functioning will trigger an
unclear paradigm shift, reducing the amount of deference to
agency decision-making and causing confusion and abuse, and (ii)
the amorphous paradigm shift will have two uniquely destructive
consequences in the administrative law realm, "rhetorical Daubert"
and "generic Daubert." To illustrate my concerns, Part II will
explain how agencies might adopt some sort of regulatory Daubert
and Part III details the problems with unclear or ambiguous
paradigm shifts and how attempts to insert Daubert into the
regulatory context are ill-conceived and ill-defined.
II. How AGENCIES MIGHT ADOPT DAUBERT
Although agencies perform different functions than courts, and
operate under constitutional doctrine and statutory laws specific to
them, there have been several suggestions as to how agencies
might adopt Daubert from the judicial model. First, agencies may
apply their statutory directives more vigorously. Alternatively,
Congress may impose Daubert-like mechanisms by statutorily
requiring agencies to screen expert evidence upon which they base
decisions. Additionally, agencies may explicitly adopt Daubert in
either adjudication or rulemaking, 36 requiring decision makers to
36 A recent search of the Federal Register reveals three citations to Daubert
in agency rulemaking. One involved the Department of Justice's revision of the
Rules of Evidence used in Courts Martial. Manual for Courts Martial; Proposed
Amendments, Summary of Public Comment, 66 Fed. Reg. 63040, 63045 (Dec.
4, 2001); Manual for Courts Martial; Notice of Proposed Amendments,
Summary of Public Comment, 66 Fed. Reg. 30431, 30435 (Jun. 6, 2001). The
other two specifically rejected calls from industry for the agency to adopt
Daubert. See Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Coal Miners,
Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 5526, 5596-97 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 72) [Re-asserted in Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of
Underground Coal Miners, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 32868, 32912 (June 6,
act as agency gatekeepers. Further, agencies may reject a
gatekeeper function but still adopt a Daubert standard when
decision-makers weigh already admitted evidence. Most subtly,
and perhaps most perniciously, agencies and the reviewing courts
may adopt a Daubert attitude or as some have called it "the spirit
of Daubert."
A. More Vigorous Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Review
Agencies play a different role than courts. Agencies include
any "authority of the government of the United States," not
including Congress, the courts and a few other limited
exceptions.37 Typically, when we think of agencies, we think of
executive and independent agencies that have been given some
relatively specific function in their enabling statutes and some
range of powers. 38 That is, agencies target specific problems 39 and
are limited by enabling statutes, the APA, and the Constitution.
40
Generally speaking, the APA provides a framework within
which agencies must operate. The APA defines agency functioning
41and procedure as well as judicial review. Naturally,
constitutional law, common law doctrine, and specific enabling
acts supplement this framework. In terms of procedure, the APA
2005)]; Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning
the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, Final Rule,
65 Fed. Reg. 1000 (June 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). There
have been no meaningful cites to Daubert since Diesel Particulate in 2005, as of
this article's publication date.
37 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 (2000).
38 See, e.g., In re Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(distinguishing between independent and executive agencies).
39 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (5th ed. 2003) ("[A]lthough
each agency has its own distinctive social and political history, agencies
typically are responses not only to the perception of social problems warranting
government response, but also the perception that existing institutions are
inadequate to the task.").
40 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 39, at 1-3.
41 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-559, 701-706 (2000).
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provides minimum standards to cabin agency action. APA sections
553, 554 and 556 provide a framework for formal and informal
adjudication and rulemaking.42 APA section 706 instructs courts to
review agency action (whether formal or informal) to ensure that it
is reasonable, based upon the record, and in accordance with the
Constitution and all applicable laws and procedures.43
There are thus already administrative law provisions that
promote reliability, reasonableness, and proper procedure. For
example, APA section 556(d) requires evidence to be "supported
by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence." 44 Admittedly, APA section 556(d) speaks more to the
sufficiency of evidence rather than to its admissibility. However,
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), and specifically FRE 702
regarding admission of experts, from which Daubert evolved, do
not apply to administrative agencies.45 Courts conduct review of
the agency record under the APA and, therefore, the Federal Rules
of Evidence are not implicated.
Likewise, APA section 553 affords a reliability mechanism in
the informal rulemaking context. Section 553 requires that
interested parties be given notice of a proposed rule and its basis,
as well as an opportunity to respond to the proposal with
comments. 46 In United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products,47 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that an agency's
42 Id. at §§ 553, 554, 556.
41 Id. at § 706.
44 Id. at § 556(d).
45 Id. at § 706.
46 Id. at § 553(c) provides:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this
subsection.
47 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
"failure to disclose to interested persons the scientific data upon
which the [Food and Drug Administration] relied was procedurally
erroneous." 48 The agency, in regulating the manufacturing
processes for smoked whitefish, relied upon undisclosed outside
studies. The requirement to disclose the scientific information was
a function of judicial review and the court was charged under
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe49 to satisfy itself that
the agency had considered all relevant factors.50 Thus, one view of
judicial review would require agencies engaged in rulemaking
based upon scientific evidence to make the evidence available for
comment. Further, courts should review whether the agency
considered all relevant factors in making its decision, which would
include responding to those comments.51
Finally, there is review pursuant to APA section 706. Courts
will "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law."52 Thus, courts
can invalidate agency action based upon junk science as an abuse
of agency discretion.
Some have drawn the connection between administrative law
provisions and Daubert, arguing that these provisions are
consistent with Daubert or indeed provide the foundation for its
adoption. Arguably, these provisions do the work of Daubert in
the administrative setting. If they do, one might ask what Daubert
may add and, if it adds nothing, then what harm will it do.
Daubert's potential harm is that it may add more rigor, more
48 Id. at 252.
" 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
50 Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 251 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16
and Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973)).
51 In Nova Scotia, however, the court specifically noted that an agency may
resort to its own expertise outside of the record. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 251.
The agency in that case did not have specific scientific expertise in the matter
under consideration. Id.
52 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
53 See Miller & Rein, supra note 26, at 307 (explaining how Daubert under
APA section 556(d) becomes a decisional standard rather than an admissibility
standard).
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rhetoric, and/or an attitude change signaling a distrust of agency
science.
We can see that some courts have turned to Daubert even
though they might have reached the same result relying upon the
APA. In Sec. of Labor v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp.,54 the court
upheld the decisions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and
the Federal Mine Safety Health and Review Commission, rejecting
a claim by the Secretary of Labor that mine operators had
intentionally tampered with coal samples. In doing so, the court
invoked both Joiner and Daubert in affirming the ALJ's finding
that the "Secretary's scientific evidence was inconclusive or
otherwise could not be adequately evaluated., 55 The court noted
"[a]ll of these issues involve conflicting expert testimony, and this
Court must defer to the reasonable determination of the trier of fact
regarding not only the relevance but the reliability of the expert
testimony presented at trial., 56 It would seem there is an
established basis in administrative law to defer to the "reasonable
determination of the trier of fact., 57 This basis is the arbitrary and
capricious review under APA section 706.58 One could question
14 151 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
" Id. at 1107.
56 Id. (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579).
57 Id.
58 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
whether Daubert's invocation is harmful. After all, if the result is
justified, why does the invocation of an arguably analogous
doctrine undermine the court's ultimate reliance upon the APA and
standard administrative law doctrine? It is harmful because it
validates a shadow regime with vastly different objectives in which
there is less deference to agencies and more power placed in the
hands of courts. It validates this regime slowly, letting it creep into
agency functioning without serious and probing consideration. It
signals the existence of a standard by which agencies may be
judged without delineating the contours of the standard. Indeed,
because the reference to Daubert is merely dicta, courts do not
have to explain their references to it in a meaningful way.
The turn to Daubert may stem from a desire for a more
vigorous and more Daubert-like approach to agencies' use of
science. 59 After all, APA sections 553 and 556 merely require
relevant and probative evidence to be considered and, when not
based upon agency expertise, to be available to all involved to
view and challenge. These are still fairly deferential mechanisms.
Some would call for Daubert to limit agency discretion to consider
evidence further than that set out in the APA. One set of
commentators has suggested that "as a matter of policy and
statutory interpretation, the Daubert reliability standard should
apply to federal environmental rulemaking and adjudication., 60
Perhaps, this could mean that agency decision-makers would be
required either by Congress or the courts to measure proffered
evidence according to the Daubert factors, either prior to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
59 Raul & Dwyer, supra note 5, at 7 (citing "the need for a mechanism to
enable more rigorous, consistent review of agency science").
60 Charles D. Weller & David B. Graham, New Approaches to
Environmental Law and Agency Regulation: The Daubert Litigation Approach,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10557, 10568-69 (2000).
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considering it or in determining what weight to assign to it.
B. Statutorily Mandated Daubert Review
Congress could require some form of Daubert analysis in
agency decision making. To some extent, the DQA discussed in
Science for Judges IV and V has already started the
"Daubertization" process, 61 removing some agency discretion with
62
respect to scientific evidence. The DQA commands relevant
agencies to "issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including
statistical information) disseminated by the agency." 63 The Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) Guidelines,64 in explicating
the mechanisms individual agencies must create, envision specific
agency guidelines that take a common sense approach and that do
not impose undue burdens upon agency resources or inhibit the
dissemination of information. 65 Lastly, under the Guidelines,
61 Wagner, Importing Daubert, supra note 6, at 590-91; Wagner, "Bad
Science" Fiction, supra note 26, at 63. Professor McGarity has discussed
Daubertizing more generally. See McGarity, "Daubertizing" Judicial Review,
supra note 14.
62 Information Quality Act, § 515(b)(2)(A), 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000).
63 Id.
64 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity,
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed.
Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Guidelines].
65 Id. In a general sense, the Guidelines try to tailor the correction process
in a way that does not prevent the agencies from doing their respective jobs.
Agencies "are required to undertake only the degree of correction that they
conclude is appropriate for the nature and timeliness of the information
involved." Id. at 8458. Additionally, the Guidelines "stress the importance of
having agencies apply these standards and develop their administrative
mechanisms so they can be implemented in a common sense and workable
manner." Id. at 8453. The OMB Guidelines have some limits in that they apply
only when "the agency represents the information as, or uses the information in
support of, an official position of the agency." Id. Although, the DQA governs
information prepared by outside sources and endorsed by agencies. Id. at 8454
("[T]hese guidelines govern an agency's dissemination of information, but
generally do not govern a third-party's dissemination of information (the
"influential" information (i.e., information with an important
impact on public policy or private sector interests) requires greater
scrutiny. 66 The Guidelines leave the form and function of this
greater scrutiny up to the individual agencies. The general trend of
the DQA and the OMB Guidelines, however, is to establish a
framework to limit agency discretion over scientific evidence. It
requires agencies to establish a procedure by which parties can
petition agencies to correct information disseminated by the
agency.
67
Professor Wagner has succinctly described the burden that may
fall upon agencies:
This petition process places interested parties in the role of
peer reviewer. They can allege, through a formal process,
that a study should be excluded from regulatory decision-
making because it is too unreliable to be useful ....
Disgruntled complainants whose request for correction are
denied can file an appeal with the agency. It is also
expected that complaints and requests for correction will
carry some weight if an agency action is challenged in
court and that they might even be appealable in and of
exception being where the agency is essentially using the third-party to
disseminate information on the agency's behalf)"). In addition, information used
by specific parties in adjudication is not subject to the DQA. Id. at 8454
(excluding adjudicatory materials from the term "disseminated," thereby
exempting those materials from the DQA because "[t]here are well-established
procedural safeguards and rights to address the quality of adjudicatory decisions
and to provide persons with an opportunity to contest decisions").
66 Id. (noting that "[g]iven the differences in the many Federal agencies
covered by these guidelines, and the differences in the nature of the information
they disseminate, we [OMB] ... believe it will be helpful if agencies elaborate
this definition of 'influential' in the context of their missions and duties, with
due consideration to the information they disseminate").
67 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515 (commanding agencies guided by the DQA to "establish
administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain
correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does
not comply with the guidelines").
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themselves under limited circumstances.
68
A recent visit to the Council on Regulatory Competitiveness
69
revealed 152 petitions and requests for corrections.70 The very
burden of responding to these inquiries may be enough to affect a
Daubert shift by influencing internal agency functioning.
Resources will be diverted to respond to these inquiries and one
can imagine the chilling effect that these inquiries will have upon
agency initiative.
71
Likewise, the application of the DQA promises not just
increased burdens but the potential for obfuscation and abuse.
Professor Wagner described this amorphous problem with the
DQA:
Also like Daubert, the criteria for "good" versus "bad"
science or science related information is amorphous, but
the inability to validate or replicate the study is one of the
primary grounds for challenging the information. Finally,
those filing the complaints generally do not limit their
concerns to scientific quality or reliability, but also contest
embedded judgments and policy choices in the agencies'
use of scientific research, even though the challenges are
framed as if they concerned only technical information.
72
68 Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction, supra note 26, at 69 (citations omitted).
69 See The Center for Regulatory Effectiveness Home Page,
http://www.thecre.com.
70 The Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Federal Agency Data Quality
Petitions by Agency, http://thecre.com/quality/petitions.html. We determined
that 152 petitions and requests for corrections since the passing of the DQA by
following each link to agency DQA websites and tabulating total petitions. Id.
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
71 Wagner, Importing Daubert, supra note 6, at 613 (noting the "[DQA]
may cause agencies to think twice before disseminating information although it
is difficult to locate concrete evidence of this effect").
72 Id. at 597.
C. Judicially Imposed Daubert Standards or Principles for
Agency Adjudications
A wholly distinct means of limiting agencies' discretion over
scientific evidence would be to subject any scientific evidence
offered in administrative proceedings to a Daubert hearing. Thus,
in an administrative adjudication, the agency decision-maker
would be required to conduct a Daubert hearing to determine
whether evidence could even be considered by the agency.
Alternatively, a court could impose Daubert upon judicial review
of the agency decisions; however, doing so would presumably
force the agency to conduct some sort of initial Daubert inquiry in
order to increase its chances of success upon review.73
No court has yet required an administrative agency to exclude
expert testimony based upon Daubert, although one district court
has countenanced Daubert and invoked its spirit by opining that it
could be used as an admissibility rule by agencies.74 In Lobsters,
Inc. v. Evans,75 after noting that the rules of evidence did not apply
to a decision made by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration that a vessel had entered prohibited waters, the
court nevertheless invoked the spirit of Daubert.76 The court
pronounced, "[n]onetheless 'the spirit of Daubert' does apply to
administrative proceedings because 'junk science has no more
place in administrative proceedings than in judicial ones.' 77 Why
the court needed the spirit of Daubert is unclear, as it first recited
the applicable regulations requiring that admissible evidence be
"relevant, material, reliable, and probative and not unduly
repetitious or cumulative." 78 It might have invoked Daubert's
spirit to validate the Daubert hearing held by the ALJ.
Nevertheless, the AU had limited his Daubert application to
7' For a list of regulatory Daubert proposals, see Wagner, "Bad Science"
Fiction, supra note 26, at 70 n.29.
74 Lobsters, Inc. v. Evans, 346 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D. Mass. 2004).
75 id.
76 Id. at 344.
77 Id. (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004)).
78 Id. at 344 (citing 15 C.F.R. § 904.251 (b) (2004)).
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assessing the weight of the evidence, whereas the court indicated
that Daubert factors were not limited in function. They could be
used not only for weighing the evidence but for admissibility as
well.7 9
As Lobsters, Inc. illustrates, courts or agencies adopting
Daubert could not only invoke Daubert to exclude evidence, they
could also use it to assess the weight accorded to the evidence.
Courts have suggested that although agencies are not bound by the
FRE and can hear all evidence, they must still consider Daubert in
weighing that evidence.80  It is unclear what about Daubert they
must consider. One possibility is that agencies should base their
decisions on evidence that is reliable, probative, and substantial;
however, agencies are already required by APA section 556(d) to
do that in proceedings subject to APA section 556, and APA
section 706 provides a general check on arbitrariness in all other
cases by requiring judicial review.8' Perhaps agencies (or the
courts) should use the Daubert factors to assess the reliability or
probity of the evidence. Given that agencies are specialized, in
some cases experts themselves, and required to evaluate the
worthiness of evidence as experts, it is unclear that adoption of
such a standard would lead to anything less than some sort of
distrust or heightened skepticism of scientific evidence by
administrative agencies. Perhaps all that is meant is that agencies
should be more skeptical of science. Proponents of regulatory
79 Id. at 345 ("The Daubert factors can, in fact, be used to exclude evidence
from an administrative hearing if the AU finds the evidence to be unreliable;
their function is not limited, as the AU in his Initial Decision suggested, to
bearing upon the weight afforded to the evidence once admitted.").
80 One court, although explicitly rejecting Daubert, nevertheless seemed to
express a view that agencies performed a Daubert-like function in weighing
evidence. The court first stated that because of agency skill and expertise,
"Daubert does not apply directly.., because it is based on Fed. R. Evid. 702,
which agencies need not follow." Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d
465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001). But thereafter, the court noted: "[Agencies] have a
corresponding obligation to use that skill when evaluating technical evidence."
Id. (emphasis in original).
81 See supra notes 41 to 52 and accompanying text.
Daubert might say that agencies should be wary of junk science.8 2
It would seem to me that agencies should have always been wary
of junk science and that current administrative law doctrine should
guard against it.
Nevertheless, courts still speak of the plague of junk science as
a new worry for agencies exposed by the light of Daubert. In
Peabody Coal Company v. McCandless,83 the court invoked
Daubert by stating that since Daubert, courts understood the
importance of reliable scientific evidence. 84 It then recognized
Daubert's technical inapplicability in reviewing evidence in
support of a Black Lung benefits case because "our dispute does
not entail a contest of admissibility," 85 but went on to morph
Daubert into a weighing of the evidence standard. The court
acknowledged that Daubert did not apply because the ALJ could
use his skill to handle evidence that might mislead a jury.86 The
court stated the AU had "a corresponding obligation to use that
skill when evaluating technical evidence." 87 It is unclear why the
court referenced Daubert; as if now that we have Daubert we
know the AL's decision was wrong. The AL's decision was
based upon a non-medical rule that arbitrarily gave more credence
to some physicians than others. 88 The case could have been
82 Raul & Dwyer, supra note 5, at 43 ("If agencies may justify their policy
preferences based on junk science, government accountability, and perhaps even
public health, might suffer gravely. Junk science can lead agencies to foist
misleading remedial measures on the public, thereby diverting or misdirecting
regulatory efforts from more effectively serving the public interest.").
83 Peabody Coal Co., 255 F.3d 465.
84 Id. at 468.
85 Id. at 469.
86 Id. ("Agencies relax the rules of evidence because they believe that they
have the skill needed to handle evidence that might mislead a jury.").
87 Id.
88 Id. The court stated:
[Agency decision makers] avoided the medical dispute by adopting a
non-medical rule that physicians who work in white smocks are more
reliable than physicians who do their work in the laboratory. As that
preference has no apparent medical basis-and as it contradicts many
decisions requiring agencies to resolve scientific controversies on the
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resolved using standard administrative law doctrine. Again, the
harm here is not that the court reached the wrong result. The harm
is the way in which Daubert creeps into administrative
functioning-either as a sloppy analogy or as a pernicious throw
away reference that validates an entirely new framework.
Some commentators and courts have suggested what I would
call a Daubert-light approach. In this approach, the agency must be
mindful of the spirit of Daubert. I am not sure what the spirit of
Daubert tells us, but the spiritual invocations thus far seem to warn
against untested or unreliable science. Lobsters Inc. warned of
unreliable science, and in Niam v. Ashcrof,89 Judge Posner
invoked Daubert's spirit somewhat gratuitously in striking down
an immigration judge's arbitrary refusal to hear from an expert.
After noting that "the federal rules of evidence do not apply to the
federal administrative agencies,' 90 the court noted "'U]unk
science' has no more place in administrative proceedings than in
judicial ones." 91 The call upon the spirit was nevertheless
unnecessary because, as the court pointed out, the immigration
judge had arbitrarily imposed a higher standard than that required
by Daubert.92 It is not hard to imagine that Daubert's spirit will be
invoked to undermine an agency decision that would otherwise
pass arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence review.
Other cases have squarely rejected a Daubert incursion into
administrative law.93 In Stewart v. Potts,94 the district court,
reviewing a decision by the Army Corps of Engineers, stated
Daubert "does not apply to APA review of agency action." 95 The
merits rather than through legal legerdemain-the result cannot stand.
Id. at 469.
89 354 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2004).
90 Id. at 660.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Stewart v. Potts, 996 F. Supp. 668, 678 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
("The Court's task under the APA is to ensure that the agency's decisions are
not arbitrary or capricious; it is not to evaluate their scientific methods.").
94 Id.
95 Id.
court ruled that in light of its role, it must defer to the expert
96 . 97
agency. Likewise, in Sierra Club v. Marita, petitioners
challenged the Forest Service's consideration of ecological and
biological evidence by suggesting Daubert as a means to evaluate
whether the Forest Service's "scientific assertions are owed any
deference. ' 98 The court rejected the idea by noting that although
Daubert's use might lead to better documentation, that was not the
role of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under review.
"An EIS is designed to ensure open and honest debate of the
environmental consequences of an agency action, not to prove
admissibility of testimony in a court of law."
99
D. Daubert and Rulemaking
One might expect Daubert and Daubert-like challenges to
creep into the rulemaking realm and infect agency functioning
even prior to any judicial review. A recent search of the Federal
Register revealed two relevant references to Daubert.100 In both
cases the agency rejected the notion that Daubert applied to agency
rulemaking. In one case, the agency dismissed a plea from the
industry to employ Daubert by noting the differences between
litigation and agency policy setting through rule-making:
[T]he purpose of this risk assessment is not to establish
96 id.
9' 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
98 Id. at 622.
99 Id.
100 See Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Coal Miners,
Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 5526 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
72); Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the
Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, Final Rule, 65
Fed. Reg. 1000 (June 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). The one
other reference to Daubert in the Federal Register involved the Department of
Justice's revision of the Rules of Evidence used in Courts Martial. Manual for
Courts Martial; Proposed Amendments, Summary of Public Comment, 66 Fed.
Reg. 63040, 63045 (Dec. 4, 2001); Manual for Courts Martial; Notice of
Proposed Amendments, Summary of Public Comment, 66 Fed. Reg. 30431,
30435 (Jun. 6, 2001).
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civil liabilities for personal injury. [The Mine Safety and
Health Administration's] concern is with reducing the risk
of lung cancer, not with establishing the specific cause of
lung cancer for an individual miner. The excess risk of an
outcome, given an excessive exposure, is not the same
thing as the likelihood that an excessive exposure caused
the outcome in a given case. To understand the difference,
it may be helpful to consider two analogies: (1) the
likelihood that a given death was caused by a lightning
strike is relatively low, yet exposure to lightning is rather
hazardous; (2) a specific smoker may not be able to prove
that his or her lung cancer was "more likely than not"
caused by radon exposure, yet radon exposure significantly
increases the risk-especially for smokers. Lung cancer has a
variety of alternative causes, but this fact does not reduce
the risk associated with any one of them. 1 1
One case specifically rejected a plea for Daubert in a
rulemaking context. In Edison Elec. Inst. v. Envt/. Prot. Agency, 10 2
the EPA issued new regulations pursuant to the Clean Water Act
regarding the discharge of pollutants, which included compliance
levels and permit procedures. The EPA decided upon the use of
certain tests to determine toxicity compliance and industry
organizations sued on the basis that the EPA test was not
sufficiently valid. Upon review, the court determined the test was
sufficiently reliable and the EPA's use of the test was not arbitrary
and capricious. 10 3 In a footnote, the court addressed and dismissed
any potential Daubert issue as follows:
Petitioners suggest, without supporting authority, that
because the test results will be used as evidence in
enforcement proceedings, EPA's rulemaking had to comply
with the standard for scientific evidence articulated in Fed.
R. Evid. 702, as interpreted in Daubert .... Evidentiary
'01 Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Coal Miners, 66
Fed. Reg. at 5596-97.
102 391 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
103 Id. at 1270.
rules govern the admissibility of evidence at trial, not the
establishment of the processes whereby such evidence will
be created. See Fed. R. Evid. 101 ("These rules govern
proceedings in the courts of the United States . ). 104
The court was not persuaded by the fact that enforcement
proceedings could be based upon the scientific test that was being
challenged, but the court did leave open the possibility that the
test's reliability could be challenged in an enforcement proceeding
as lacking sufficient reliability. 0 5 The court also noted the EPA
had fully explained its reasoning and rationales for using this
particular test in the response to comments and in the Final Rule
itself. 1
°6
I think Daubert's invocation in any matter other than simply
requiring the vigorous application of already-established
administrative law doctrines'0 7 threatens agencies with an unclear
paradigm shift to a less deferential, more searching distrust of
agency decisions based upon science. Adopting Daubert in agency
rulemaking and adjudication would affect a "sea-change in federal
agency law."' 08 A paradigm shift to a more skeptical approach is
unwarranted, unclear, and unhelpful. More importantly for the
purposes of this essay, it will bring confusion and instability. It
also holds unique dangers because it is an attempt to manipulate
administrative law doctrine, not to affect administrative law
functioning, but to effectuate deregulatory goals in particular
substantive areas of law.
'04 Id. at 1269 n.2.
105 Id. at 1272.
106 Id. at 1269. As in the adjudication context, under the APA, rulemaking
decisions must still be based upon reliable information. See, e.g., Cellular Phone
Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to find that the FCC had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying upon expert organization and
federal agencies when enacting radiation Guidelines). But see Miller & Rein,
supra note 26, at 316 (citing Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC for the
proposition that courts are already implicitly applying Daubert to review of
agency rulemaking even though the case does not mention Daubert).
107 See, e.g., supra note 58 and accompanying text.
108 Weller & Graham, supra note 60, at 10569.
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III. THE DANGER OF A DA UBERT SHIFT
A paradigm shift changing the way in which agencies or courts
assess scientific evidence will be necessarily vague, causing
endless confusion, subject to manipulation and abuse, and
undermine administrative law. Part A of this section will illustrate
the problem with unclear paradigm shifts using one of the most
significant shifts in administrative law, the Chevron doctrine. The
uncertainty, confusion and details of the Chevron shift have
worked themselves out, but it has taken twenty years. In addition
to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding Chevron, the doctrine
was subject to manipulation and abuse. 10 9 Although, on the whole
I would contend that Chevron was useful in that it sought to
improve administrative law functioning by ushering in a new era of
greater deference to agency decision-making, 1i0 it was not without
costs.
A Daubert shift holds none of Chevron 's promise and will
impose the same types of costs as Chevron as well as some
additional costs. The normative shift that arises from
"Daubertization" has little to do with administrative functioning
and more to do with deregulation in specific areas of substantive
law."' A Daubert shift would leave too many unanswered
questions and would be particularly susceptible to abuse, leading
parties to invoke Daubert either as a rhetorical tool or a generic
standard. Finally, a Daubert shift would also be an anti-Chevron
shift, repudiating Chevron's progress towards a more flexible and
pragmatic administrative state.
109 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
110 Cf Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
72 CHI. KENT L. REv. 1253, 1259 (1997) ("[T]oday reviewing courts regard
Chevron as useful in providing a manageable framework, yet critical judicial
scrutiny of administrative actions has continued.., oriented around the Chevron
terminology.").
111 McGarity, "Daubertizing" Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 156
(referring to the "Daubertization" proponents' normative agenda).
A. The Chevron Shift
Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 112
marks one of the most significant paradigm shifts in administrative
law. As is often described, the case established the Chevron two-
step.113 First, a court would look to the statute to ascertain whether
Congress had spoken to the issue.' 14 If it had, the court would
simply implement the will of Congress." 5 However, if Congress
had not spoken to the matter, then the court would defer or,
perhaps more accurately, accept a reasonable agency
interpretation. 116
Professor Donald Elliott has explained how Chevron
effectuated a paradigm shift on several levels. Chevron, of course,
had rhetorical power," 7 but more than that it "re-conceptualized
the relative roles of courts and agencies when construing statutes
over which agencies have been given interpretive rights."'"18 It
changed the internal dynamics of agencies" 19 and "power shifted
112 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
113 Id. at 843-44; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 975-80 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial
Deference] (noting how lower courts took Chevron as a guide to reviewing
agency decisions by first looking for specific intent of Congress; then, if the
Congress has not spoken to the issue, to decide, in a deferential manner, whether
the agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable).
114 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 ("[F]irst, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.").
115 Id. at 842-43 ("If the intent of the Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
116 Id. at 842-44. The Chevron two-step first considers whether Congress
has explicitly spoken to the issue. If not, then consider whether the agency's
interpretation of the guiding statute is reasonable. Id.
117 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine
Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law,
16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) [hereinafter Elliott, Chevron Matters].
118 Id. at 2.
19 Id. at 11 ("Chevron's importance is also demonstrated by the change it
caused in the dynamics inside agencies.").
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from the judiciary to the Executive Branch."' 120 However, the
parameters of the Chevron standard were not immediately clear.
Three significant issues persisted over the years: (i) what tools
could be used for step one of Chevron to determine whether
Congress had spoken to the precise issue, (ii) what agency
decisions were entitled to Chevron analysis, and (iii) what
qualified as "reasonable" under Chevron step two. First, it was not
certain to what length a court could go to ascertain whether
Congress has spoken to the matter, i.e., what means of statutory
interpretation could be used. Courts and scholars invoked various
approaches to ascertain what Congress meant, 121 with some
invoking a textualist approach,122 rejecting the use of legislative
history and trying to ascertain Congress's meaning from the text
alone, and sometimes with the help of dictionaries. 123
120 Id. at 4. Although some commented that perhaps Chevron did not have
to be seen as a major change, after time, as Professor Elliott notes, "Chevron
signified a fundamental paradigm shift." Id. at 2. See also Sunstein, supra note
4, at 2088 ("Chevron reflects a salutary understanding that these judgments of
policy and principle should be made by administrators rather than judges.").
Professor Elliott notes that he initially characterized Chevron as affecting a
subtle change. Elliott, Chevron Matters, supra note 117, at 1. In short, Chevron
signaled a new era of judicial deference to agency interpretation. Merrill,
Judicial Deference, supra note 113, at 971-72 ("Chevron is widely understood
to mark a significant transformation in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of
deference."). Professor Merrill went on to explain however that Chevron failed
to "produce anything like a complete revolution in the Court's jurisprudence."
Id. at 980.
121 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995) (discussing intentionalism and textualism).
122 See, e.g., Immigration Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("Judges interpret
laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions.").
123 Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine:
In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REv. 393, 398 (1996) (arguing that
Justice Scalia, textualism's Supreme Court provocateur, and textualism in
general have been incorrectly labeled as hostile to the Chevron doctrine).
Despite the growing emergence of textualism as the answer to Chevron step one,
as recently as 2000 the Supreme Court arguably rejected the plain meaning of a
statute in Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
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Second, for over twenty years after Chevron there was a debate
over what "types" of agency decisions deserved Chevron
analysis, 124 with some arguing that Chevron analysis should rely in
part upon the format by which the agency issues an
interpretation, 12 5 and others saying every authoritative agency
interpretation deserves Chevron.126 Finally in 2001, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Mead Corp. addressed whether Chevron
analysis would apply to customs classification rulings. 127 Mead
rejected the government's attempt to grab Chevron deference for
rulings that could hardly be compared to regulations enacted
pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures. Instead the Court
fashioned a new mantra for the invocation of Chevron, namely
whether "Congress intended such ruling to carry the force of
law. ', 128 However, even after Mead, questions regarding Chevron's
U.S. 120 (2000). At issue was the statutory meaning of the terms "drug" and
"drug delivery devices." Instead of limiting itself to the text, the Court
considered prior legislative action and inaction in its Chevron analysis when
discerning what Congress meant. Id. at 131-33.
124 See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 36-42 (1990) (discussing various
formats for agency interpretations).
125 Id.; Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Unto the Breach:
Reconciling Chevron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States
v. Haggar Apparel Company, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1167 (2000).
126 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 590 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("Quite appropriately... we have accorded Chevron
deference not only to agency regulations, but to authoritative agency positions
set forth in a variety of other formats."). For examples of authoritative agency
decisions receiving Chevron deference, Justice Scalia cites INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (adjudication); NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (letter of
Comptroller of the Currency); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 647-48 (1990) (evaluating the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
decision to restore pension benefit plan); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476
U.S. 974, 978-79 (1986) (acknowledging the Food and Drug Administration's
"longstanding interpretation of the statute," reflected in no-action notice
published in the Federal Register"). Christensen, 529 U.S. at 590-91.
127 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
128 Id. at 221. The Court stated:
[W]hen it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
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application continued in Barnhart v. Walton. 129 As Robert Anthony
points out, some unfortunate language in Barnhart
mischaracterizes Mead and muddies the waters concerning to
which types of agency interpretations Chevron applies. 
130
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety
of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent.
Id. at 226-27.
129 535 U.S. 212 (2002). In Barnhart, the Court considered the Social
Security Administration's interpretation of the word "disability." The Court had
little problem finding the statute ambiguous and that Chevron analysis applied.
Applying Chevron, the Court found that the agency's interpretation was a
permissible one. Id. at 217-19.
130 Robert Anthony, Keeping Chevron Pure, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 371 (2002).
Professor Anthony quotes from Barnhart, "[Mead] indicated that whether a
court should give such deference depends in significant part upon the
interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue." Id. at 372.
Professor Anthony explains, "Mead said no such thing, either in the cited pages
or elsewhere." Id. Mead, as explained by Professor Anthony, focused upon
whether Congress had delegated to the agency the power to interpret with the
"force of law." Id. In addition, Professor Anthony points out that the opinion
also contains other language suggesting that a weighing of factors displaces the
"force of law test established by Mead." Id. at 373.
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and
the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long
period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal
lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation at
issue.
Id. at 373. Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Mead, suggested that courts
would struggle with its proscription for some time to come. Mead, 533 U.S. at
239. The Second Circuit has endorsed Barnhart in Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, 383 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 2004). See also Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wilson-
Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2002).
Less formal interpretations may also be entitled to mandatory
deference, depending upon to what extent the underlying statute suffers
from exposed gaps in policies, especially if the statute itself is very
Lastly, there is the question of what is a reasonable
interpretation sufficient to satisfy step two of Chevron. Despite
twenty years of cases and commentary, clarification of its breadth,
scope, and meaning is still wanting.' 3 1 Professor Levin has
succinctly articulated the problem:
The vagueness of the step two standard was troubling
enough, but more pertinent to my theme is the fact that the
two-step test also seemed to verge on internal incoherence.
Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court should
not reach step two unless it has already found during step
one that the statute supports the government's
interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In
other words, the agency's view is not clearly contrary to the
meaning of the statute. If the court has made such a finding,
one would think that the government's interpretation must
be at least "reasonable" in the court's eyes. Why, then, is
the second step not superfluous? Obviously, if it is to be
meaningful, the step two inquiry has to involve
qualitatively different considerations from those implicated
during step one. Yet the Court's opinion did not identify
those considerations. In this sense, Chevron left the very
meaning of the second step ill-defined; further clarification
was going to be necessary.132
In short, while Chevron shifted the balance between courts and
agencies, it did so in a manner which was less than clear.'
33
complex, as well as on the agency's expertise in making such policy
decisions, the importance of the agency's decisions to the
administration of the statute, and the degree of consideration the agency
has given the relevant issues over time.
Id. at 137-38 (citing Barnhart, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)).
131 William R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN
L. REv. 957, 960-61 (2004). See Levin, supra note 110, at 1254 (noting that step
two and arbitrary and capricious review are not just overlapping but identical).
132 Levin, supra note 110, at 1260-61 (emphasis in original).
133 As Professor Andersen points out, "other than litigation, there does not
seem to be any practical way of predicting what a court will do with an agency
legal interpretation." Andersen, supra note 131, at 961. See also Sunstein, supra
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Perhaps, Chevron's ambiguity stemmed from one of its positive
attributes, namely that Chevron represented an attitude change.'
34
It basically stood for the proposition that courts should and would
be more deferential to agencies. 135 It is understandable that the
specifics of that attitude would take time to evolve as the law needs
to react to new contexts. Paradigm shifts are not intrinsically bad,
but unclear or vague shifts are more subject to abuse and
misapplication. Although paradigm shifts facilitate desirable legal
evolution, ill-defined, or unclear shifts create a web of complex
problems that take time to resolve.
Additionally, paradigm shifts change not only what happens in
the courtroom but what happens elsewhere. The Chevron shift
changed the way in which agencies operate. Chevron as a
paradigm shift crept into the administrative psyche. Professor
Donald Elliott has recently explained how Chevron affected
internal agency functioning.'
36
Post-Chevron, statutes no longer possess a single
prescriptive meaning on many questions; rather, they
describe what I call a "policy space," a range of permissible
interpretive discretion, within which a variety of decisions
that the agency might make would be legally defensible to
varying degrees. So the task of [the Office of the General
Counsel] today is to define the boundaries of legal
defensibility, and thereby to recognize that often there is
note 4, at 2084 (noting the controversy Chevron spawned).
134 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2087. Professor Sunstein noted:
Chevron is best understood and defended as a frank recognition that
sometimes interpretation is simply not a matter of uncovering
legislative will, but also involves extra textual considerations of various
kinds, including judgments about how a statute is best or most sensibly
implemented. Chevron reflects a salutary understanding that their
judgment of policy and principle should be made by administrators
rather than judges.
Id. at 2087-88.
135 Levin, supra note 110, at 1258 (noting that the courts and scholars
"periodically speak of 'Chevron' as shorthand for the principle of deference on
questions of statutory interpretation").
136 Elliott, Chevron Matters, supra note 117, at 1-2.
more than one possible interpretation of the meaning of key
statutory terms and concepts. The agency's policy-makers,
not its lawyers, should decide which of several different but
legally defensible interpretations to adopt.
Chevron opened up and validated a policy-making
dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the
agency should adopt for policy reasons, rather than what
interpretation the agency must adopt for legal reasons. I
believe that this expanded policy dialogue is productive and
that it takes place more inside EPA today than it did pre-
Chevron, and normatively, that is a good thing.'
37
Professor Elliott sees the Chevron change as "significant and
positive. ' 38 Naturally, a Daubert shift would also affect how
agencies function. One could argue whether the changes would be
desirable, but the problem with Daubert creeping into the
administrative state through an ill-defined standard is that it is
difficult to assess what those changes might be and whether they
would be desirable. Moreover, some agencies attempted to invoke
Chevron for more than it was worth. Mead is one example of
overreaching in the name of Chevron.139 Naturally, that is what
137 Id. at 12-13.
138 Id. at 13.
139 As discussed above, Mead was a customs classification ruling case.
Forty-six customs ports issue thousands of short, stock, and almost "form"
ruling letters each year. These classification letters by their very nature interpret
tariff terms and determine whether a particular item should be called by one
term or another. As in most classification cases, it was easy to find ambiguity.
Classification rulings made at most ports considered no policy and contained
little or no reasoning although headquarters rulings like the one in Mead could
contain more analysis. Mead, 533 U.S. at 224. Not surprisingly, the government
had not asserted Chevron deference in the CIT. After United States v. Haggar
Apparel, 526 U.S. 380 (1999), holding that Chevron applied to classification
regulations, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit requested the parties to
brief the impact of Haggar on customs rulings. Id. at 225-26. At this point, the
government argued Chevron deference. In my view, the government
overreached here. Mead doubted whether the agency practice evidenced any
thought by the agency whether it was acting under a "lawmaking pretense"
when issuing the ruling in question. Id. at 233. As the court in Mead discussed,
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advocates do; they try to stretch the precedent to reach their case.
But ill-defined or unclear standards are easier to stretch.
B. The Dangers of Daubert Creep in the Regulatory Realm
A Daubert shift threatens the same problems seen in Chevron
and promises particular dangers because it would be even vaguer
and lacks Chevron's administrative law grounding. Regulatory
Daubert will likely engender many of the same problems
associated with the Chevron shift, such as confusion, uncertainty,
and manipulation. Because Daubert lacks Chevron's
administrative law connection, it threatens sound administrative
law doctrine and gives rise to particular dangers. Some of these
dangers include that it will be seen as a general license to distrust
agency experts altogether and it will be transformed into an
amorphous and malleable mantra of distrust in order to fit into the
administrative framework. Already, one can see that attempts to
invoke regulatory Daubert are muddied, confused, and ill-defined.
To force Daubert upon agencies, courts have invoked its spirit,
morphed it into a weighing device, misapplied it, and ignored
unique attributes of particular agencies while invoking it. Finally,
to the extent agency decision-making often blends factual and
policy issues, regulatory Daubert will inevitably impede upon the
policy function given to the agencies by Chevron and place it in
the hands of the judiciary. In this regard Daubert is the counter-
Chevron.
As discussed above, courts have also already begun an ad hoc
Daubertization of administrative law.140 As Part II indicated, courts
"the authorization for classification rulings, and Customs's practice in making
them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment process,
but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever
thought of classification rulings as deserving deference claimed for them here."
Id. at 231. The Court went on to note, "it is hard to imagine a congressional
understanding more at odds with the Chevron regime." Id. at 233.
140 As one set of commentators who propose that Daubert should apply to
administrative decisions and believe that courts have already started applying it
note, "[a]s the administrative bar becomes better acquainted with Daubert, we
believe this judicial trend will accelerate." Miller & Rein, supra note 26, at 298.
have taken at least five different Daubert approaches (some of
which can be combined with others): (i) generally sanctioning
Daubert in administrative review cases and invoking the spirit of
Daubert or Daubert principles, (ii) admitting Daubert is inapposite
but invoking the spirit of Daubert or Daubert principles
nonetheless, (iii) adopting Daubert-like language to impose higher
gatekeeping standards on agencies and courts, (iv) rejecting
Daubert as an admissibility rule but applying it as a weighing of
the evidence rule, and (v) rejecting Daubert altogether in the
administrative context. The combination of these approaches leads
to at least five deleterious results: an ill-defined standard,
confusion regarding unique agency attributes, rhetorical Daubert,
generic Daubert, and the usurpation of policy-making by courts.
1. An Ill-Defined Standard
The various regulatory Daubert approaches foreshadow a
murky paradigm shift with all the concomitant problems of
uncertainty and manipulation. These approaches raise many
unanswered questions including: whether Daubert will be an
admissibility standard or a weighing of the evidence standard;
which Daubert factors will be used; whether Daubert will displace
or complement already established agency reliability procedures. It
is unclear who will apply Daubert, the courts or the agency, and if
the agency fails to apply Daubert, will the court apply it anew or
simply view the matter as waived? One can expect advocates to
answer these questions in ways that suit their clients and courts to
struggle with their own answers over a long period of time.
Miller and Rein suggest courts are already adopting Daubert, without citing it.
They use the case of Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
2000), to argue courts are adopting the Daubert posture when reviewing agency
decision-making. "Although it lacks an express reference to Daubert standards,
[it] is an example of judicial review of agency reliance on expert evidence in
rulemaking that implicitly invokes the Daubert principles under the 'arbitrary
and capricious' standard of review." Miller & Rein, supra note 26, at 316. The
court speaks in general terms about reliability, but in the end it is quite
deferential to the agency and does not really apply the Daubert factors. Cellular
Phone Taskforce, 205 F.3d at 91.
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The cases thus far foreshadow these questions. For example, in
Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTFC),' 41 the
court sanctioned Daubert as both an admissibility and weighing
rule in administrative agencies. The court however refused to hear
an admissibility challenge to the CFTC's expert because the
challenge had not been preserved at the ALJ level, even though the
court opined that had the challenge been made successfully below,
the court would have been inclined to agree with it. 142 The court
went on to approve of the AL's weighing of the expert's
testimony as unreliable, as had also been concluded by the agency
itself. 143
2. The Problem of Unique Agencies
Another problem with Daubert in the regulatory realm is the
number and variety of agencies. Some agencies are unique and
have unique relationships with the courts that review them. How
will Daubert be adapted for each agency? What precedential effect
will such adaptations have? Libas v. United States144 contains an
early invocation of Daubert as a weighing of the evidence standard
in a regulatory context, and has been cited for the proposition that
courts can use Daubert when reviewing agency action. 145 The case
should be distinguished from other cases because of the United
States Court of International Trade's (CIT) unique standard of
14' 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000).
142 Id. at 933-34.
141 Id. at 934-35.
144 193 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
,45 Miller & Rein, supra note 26, at 308.
Libas is the first, but not the only, decision in which a reviewing court
has applied Daubert scrutiny to an agency action other than formal
adjudication. This emerging jurisprudence also stands in stark contrast
to the plea for expert deference generally advanced by the government
in cases involving review of agency scientific and technical decisions.
Id. at 310 (citations ommitted). See also Niam, 354 F.3d at 660 (citing Libas for
the proposition that the spirit of Daubert applies to administrative agencies);
Weller & Graham, supra note 60, at 10569.
review of Customs rulings. 146 The CIT reviews Customs
classification rulings de novo. 147 Although classification rulings are
entitled to a presumption of correctness, 148 this presumption is not
to be confused with deference.1 49 The CIT looks at all evidence
anew and makes its own decision. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reviews the CIT's factual
determinations for clear error and its legal determinations de150
novo.
In Libas, the CAFC reversed the CIT's classification of
imported merchandise as power-loomed fabric because it found the
evidence relied upon by the CIT, namely the Customs' fabric
testing, to be unreliable under Daubert. The CAFC agreed with the
importer that Daubert applied and that nothing in Daubert or its
progeny limited it to exclusion issues, rather it could also inform
the weight given to evidence by a trial court. 15 1 Because the
146 Ct. Int'l Trade, Rule 52; Libas, 193 F.3d at 1365 (noting that no
deference attaches to Customs classification of merchandise, rather "the [CIT]
must consider for itself whether the government's classification is correct, both
independently and in comparison with the importer's alternative") (citations
omitted).
14' 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a).
148 Id. at § 2639(a)(1).
149 Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 483-84 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
150 Ct. Int'l Trade, Rule 52(a). Thus, as the CAFC points out in its very first
sentence in the opinion, the "case is centrally about the responsibilities of a trial
court to ensure that its determinations based on expert testimony are founded
upon reliable, scientifically trustworthy procedures." Libas, 193 F.3d at 1361.
Given that the CIT is conducting de novo review, it is not relying upon the
agency expertise, rather it is the trier of fact, just as a court would be in a non-
agency case to which Daubert would clearly apply. See id. at 1366.
In any event, if a trial court relies upon expert testimony, it should
determine that the expert testimony is reliable. It would make little
sense to say that a trial court in its fact-finding role should accord much
if any weight to expert testimony, the reliability of which is not
established.
Id.
"' Libas, 193 F.3d at 1366. The CAFC thereafter qualified the CIT's
mandate concerning Daubert:
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Customs test was already part of the administrative record required
to be filed with the court, the evidence could not be excluded. 152
The court then invoked Daubert as the standard by which the court
should assess reliability. Upon remand, the CIT conducted a
Daubert hearing and found Customs' expert evidence unreliable. 153
At least one court and several commentators have cited the
case to support regulatory Daubert.154 Given the CIT's unique role
reviewing Customs decisions, this citation is probably not the best
one. As a court that reviews agency action de novo, it is a trier of
fact much like a court in a typical civil or criminal litigation
subject to Daubert.
3. Rhetorical Regulatory Daubert
Daubert appears in some administrative law cases as a
rhetorical device, a slogan, and an unnecessary prop thrown into a
court's analysis to simulate authority for the court's proposition.
The danger of Daubert as a rhetorical tool is that it will become
detached from any meaningful standard and will simply serve as a
signal to distrust agency science. In Consolidation Coal Company
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,5 5 the
court reviewed the Department of Labor's decision on the Black
There is no iron law that the Daubert factors be applied in Customs
classification cases. The Court of International Trade obviously need
not use them in every case, or even in most such cases. These factors
are primarily applicable when the question involves a technical process
where the reliability of a scientific or technical methodology has been
raised as an issue.
Id. at 1367.
152 Id. at 1366 n.2. See also Zani v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1334,
1336 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 2000).
153 Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2000).
114 See Niam, 354 F.3d at 660 (citing Libas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1233, for the
proposition that the spirit of Daubert applies to administrative agencies). See
also Elliott, 202 F.3d at 934; Miller & Rein, supra note 26, at 308; Weller &
Graham, supra note 60, at 10569.
... 294 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2002).
Lung Benefits Act. In doing so, it affirmed the ALJ, finding that
she had appropriately weighed the evidence. The ALJ had listened
to the petitioner's witness and later found that his testimony was
"unreliable and unconvincing, as the record is bereft of any
evidence reflecting that Dr. Bruce has any specialized knowledge,
training, or experience in the field of radiology."' 56 On appeal the
coal company attempted to show that the AL's decision was
irrational because it conflicted with the evidence put forth by the
petitioner's witness.157 In sustaining the AL's decision, the court
first noted that "although agencies are not bound by the evidentiary
strictures of Daubert, litigants must still satisfy the ALJ that their
experts are qualified by knowledge, training, or experience.., and
have in fact applied recognized and accepted medical principles in
a reliable way."'' 58 Daubert's reference is unnecessary to the
court's decision, but it serves a rhetorical function. Daubert's
invocation cues an intolerance of sloppy agency science.
Unfortunately it is not attached to a meaningful standard to assess
agency science; it simply signals that sloppy science is present.
Likewise, in United States Steel Mining Co. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 159 the court did not invoke
Daubert but instead used Daubert-like language noting that
"[b]ecause the [ALJ] failed to perform the important gatekeeping
function of qualifying evidence under the [APA] before relying
upon it, he made an award that [was] untenable.' 60 The court
acknowledged that the federal evidentiary rules had no place in
administrative functioning but that, in order to facilitate efficiency,
fairness, and accuracy, ALJs needed to perform a "gatekeeping
function while assessing evidence to decide the merits of a
claim., 161 It is unclear what the court means by "gatekeeping"
when it discusses assessing evidence. The term gatekeeping seems
156 Id. at 888.
157 Id. at 890.
158 Id. at 893 (citing Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 468
(7th Cir. 2001) (internal citations to Daubert omitted)).
159 187 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 1999).
160 Id. at 386.
161 Id. at 388-89.
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to suggest entry of evidence, not weight. The court later notes,
"[t]hus, in an agency proceeding the gatekeeping function to
evaluate evidence occurs when the evidence is considered in
decision-making rather than when the evidence is admitted."' 162
Although the court also couched its opinion in terms of the
obligations imposed by the APA, it seems correct to say that the
court has been influenced by Daubert rhetoric, specifically that
agencies either need gatekeepers or must become gatekeepers for
themselves (to keep shoddy science away from their decision-
making). 163
It may be that judges deciding cases involving agencies are
also the same judges that hear non-agency cases and apply Daubert
to those cases regularly. As a result, they may simply be tempted to
add in an unnecessary reference to gatekeeping or Daubert for
"good measure." But as Daubert creeps its way into review of
agency action, it starts to appear as a rhetorical rallying cry for
distrust of agency expertise.' "'Junk science' has no more place
162 Id. at 389.
163 As discussed above, the APA already provides means to ensure the use
of sound science by agencies. For example section 556(d) provides, "Any oral or
documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy
shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious
evidence." Section 556(d) continues, "a sanction may not be imposed or a rule
or an order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts
cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with reliable, probative and
substantial evidence."
164 An entirely distinct use of Daubert involving agencies arises when
agency risk assessment arises in the context of civil litigation to which the
agency is not a party. See, e.g., Buchholz v. Dayton Int'l Airport, No. C-3-94-
435 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9490, *71 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Allen v. Penn. Eng'g
Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996).
Regulatory and advisory bodies such as IARC, OSHA and EPA utilize
a 'weight of the evidence' method to assess the carcinogenicity of
various substances in human beings and suggest or make prophylactic
rules governing human exposure. This methodology results from the
preventive perspective that the agencies adopt in order to reduce public
exposure to harmful substances.
Id. at 198. Conversely in In re Paoli Railroad PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 781
(3d Cir. 1994), the court found that the EPA studies suggesting causation of
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in administrative proceedings than in judicial ones."' 65 Hopefully it
had no place before Daubert, but now Daubert, its spirit, and its
gatekeeping language provide a tempting tool for advocates.
Unfortunately, it is hard to see a principled way in which it
operates other than to say that agencies ought to make sure that the
science they use is reliable and sufficient-a duty agencies already
had.
4. Generic Daubert
A related danger in the regulatory world to rhetorical Daubert
is generic Daubert. The problem of generic Daubert arises because
regulatory Daubert is so ill-suited for the administrative
framework that it is hard to use it in any way but a generic manner.
Generic Daubert is one-size-fits-all. It can be one size fits all
because it has no form, no boundaries; it is a piece of putty that can
be shaped and contorted to whatever the cause. Thus, we see in
Peabody Coal Company v. McCandless,166 discussed above, the
court morphs Daubert into a weighing test because the court
cannot use Daubert as an admissibility test when reviewing the
administrative record. Likewise, in Elliott v. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission,167 the court said that it would have used
Daubert as an admissibility test if only the challenge had been
made below, but since no challenge had been made, the court
would countenance Daubert as a weighing of the evidence test.168
Finally, as the cases discussed illustrate, courts have revealed little
about what regulatory Daubert actually requires agencies to do,
cancer based upon animal studies were sufficiently reliable to be used in
litigation. Id. at 781 (noting in particular that "[c]ertainly, the evidence meets the
relevance requirements of Rule 402 and we think, after taking a hard look, that it
also meets the reliability requirement of Rules 702, 703 and 403"). Id. In this
case, the court admitted the expert testimony under the Daubert standards when
the EPA classified the chemical as a carcinogen. Id.
165 Niam, 354 F.3d at 660.
166 255 F.3d at 468-69.
167 202 F.3d 926, 933-34 (7th Cir. 2000).
168 See supra notes 141 to 143 and accompanying text.
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leaving courts reviewing agencies to do almost anything.
To be fair, regulatory Daubert does not have to be generic.
There are some voices that issue a clearer statement both for and
against Daubert. Some commentators have offered explicit
proposals of how Daubert could work in a regulatory context. For
example, Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer articulate a
list of factors for courts to consider when reviewing agency action
involving science including:
[W]hether 1. the agency used methodologies and
procedures that were reliable and scientifically valid; 2. the
scientific evidence relied upon was relevant for the issues
before the agency; 3. the agency has set forth the scientific
assumptions underlying its policy decisions and exposed
any uncertainties; 4. the evidence before the agency
supports the conclusion reached; 5. the agency has
considered all the important factors; and 6. the agency has
engaged in reasoned decision making, which includes
demonstrating that there is a rational connection between
the facts and the choice made. 1
69
The problem with these factors is that they are duplicative of what
the APA and the case law applying the APA already provide. 70 By
giving the courts a new checklist to review agency action again, we
are validating a shadow regime with vastly different goals than the
one that exists. Moreover, there is a real danger that the courts will
not apply factors in a methodical checklist fashion but as a symbol
of less deference. True, agencies may fail to fulfill their
responsibilities under the APA's arbitrary and capricious, or
substantial evidence review. 171 When they do, they should be
called to task on it, but their task should not change.'
72
169 Raul & Dwyer, supra note 5, at 26.
170 As others have already noted, Daubert and its offspring of the DQA
really do not mesh with the function of administrative agencies and indeed
agencies already have mechanisms to ward off "junk science." Wagner,
Importing Daubert, supra note 6, at 592-94.
171 Raul & Dwyer, supra note 5, at 22-23.
172 One set of commentators invokes the Daubert principles on the ground
that "federal courts routinely-though unpredictably-strike down agency
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5. Courts Adopting a Policy-Making Role
A judicial incursion via regulatory Daubert will impede agency
policy-making as well as agency reliance upon factual data.
Agency functions include collecting and analyzing information and
pursuing policy objectives in light of statutory mandates. 73
Chevron itself is an example of these blended tasks. 174 The Clean
Air Act authorized the EPA to establish a permit program for new
or modified stationary sources of air pollution.1 75 In adopting its
permit program, the EPA necessarily had to consider factual data
concerning whether its interpretation would lower air pollution as
envisioned by the statute. 176 Blended into this factual analysis was
a policy decision that the statute could allow for economic
growth. 177 One could imagine as a factual matter that perhaps a
different interpretation of the stationary source term would allow
for greater pollution reduction, or perhaps it would not. But the
EPA's decision necessarily contained both factual and policy
considerations. If a court were to substitute its judgment for the
agencies, it would necessarily usurp part of the agency's policy-
making role. One could argue that the court would not be
aggrandizing itself because it would simply be restraining the
agency. But stopping the agency from making the policy choice
can be the same as making the policy choice. Thus, regulatory
Daubert would be a counter-Chevron doctrine, taking the policy-
making role away from agencies and giving it to the courts.
actions because of flawed science and methodologies, and in the course of doing
so, remark upon the inadequacy of agency science." Raul & Dwyer, supra note
5, at 19.
173 Cf Professor Wagner has explained how DQA petitions challenge not
only "scientific quality or reliability, but also contest embedded judgments and
policy choices in the agencies' use of scientific research." Wagner, Importing
Daubert, supra note 6, at 597.
174 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 848 (discussing the Emissions Offset Interpretive Ruling). See id
at 858 (discussing EPA's reasons for adopting the new regulation).
177 Id. at 843.
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The cases that have arisen thus far, the attempted incursions
into the rulemaking context, and the statutory advances towards a
Daubert shift all indicate a Daubert shift will hold the same
confusion, potential for abuse, and disruption the Chevron shift
caused. Already one can imagine the unanswered questions that
will be resolved differently throughout the circuits and throughout
agencies. For example, how will Daubert affect Chevron? What
will it mean for "hard look" review? 78 Can it ever relate to
admissibility? If it relates to weighing the evidence, then how does
it affect that weighing? How will policy decisions be extricated
from factual decisions and vice versa? What does an administrative
agency Daubert hearing look like? These are just the beginning.
At the same time, what does regulatory Daubert get us? Some
would argue that junk science has no place in administrative
agencies. Agreed, but that is not because of Daubert. Yes, agencies
should police themselves and when they fail, judicial review
should remind them. But we already have mechanisms for this
within the existing administrative law framework. A Daubert shift
is about substantive deregulation. It is about agencies doing less in
substantive areas that involve science. 179 To get agencies to do
less, a Daubert shift will require the judiciary to reign in agencies.
CONCLUSION
The debate about regulatory Daubert should include a debate
on its effects on administrative agencies and the law under which
they function. It is difficult to have that debate in a meaningful
way if regulatory Daubert is allowed to creep into the law,
178 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
179 Regulatory Daubert might be part of a larger attack on the use of
science. David Michaels has written on efforts by industry to combat
government relation through casting doubt on scientific studies used by
agencies. See David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product, 292 Sci. AM., 96-102,
June 2005, available at http://www.powerlinefacts.com/Sciam-article on
lobbying.htm.
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operating as shadow authority and installing a new framework.
This new framework is less deferential to agencies than the current
framework. Commentators can argue about whether that is a good
thing. But as it stands now this framework is ill-defined and creates
a host of predictable problems, including confusion and abuse. It
also promises unique problems because it lacks any administrative
law grounding. It is ill-suited to apply across the board to all
agencies, it is likely to be used in a rhetorical and meaningless
way, and it is likely to be overused, morphed, and stretched to fit
any conceivable situation.

